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INTRODUCTION 
  Trust, commonly defined as a person’s subjective probability that his or her transacting 
party will act in a cooperative manner (e.g. Dasgupta, 1988; Gambetta, 1988), has received 
increasing attention in the economics literature.  In theory, a society with a higher degree of trust 
can more fully exploit gains from exchange even in the absence of formal means of enforcement, 
thereby lowering transaction costs and prompting investments (Arrow, 1974; Putnam, 1993).   
Several empirical studies have been conducted recently to examine this simple hypothesis.  Thus, 
there is evidence that countries with higher level of societal trust tend to exhibit higher economic 
growth and investment relative to GDP (Knack and Kiefer, 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).  Other 
studies have also found that trust is positively correlated with variables such as governmental 
efficiency (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and democracy (Paxton, 
2002), thus suggesting that trust may have an indirect economic effect associated with 
institutional development.     
These cross-country studies tend to rely on data from questionnaires using psychometric, 
attitudinal scales.  For instance, the World Values Survey (WVS), which is a collaborative effort 
among research organizations from several countries, applies the following question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people?”  The same item is also used in the General Social Survey (GSS), which is 
used to monitor the evolution of trust and other variables within the United States.   
Given the increasing use of WVS- and GSS-like measures of trust, a critical question is 
whether they really measure trust or something else.  Using students from Harvard University, 
Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) addressed this question by examining whether 
attitudinal, questionnaire-based measures of trust are statistically correlated with behavioral ones, 
obtained from experimental transactions.  One of their experiments, a variant of Berg, Dickhaut 
and McCabe’s (1995) “trust game,” is basically an interaction between two people.   Before their 
actual interaction, subjects respond to a questionnaire including the WVS/GSS trust item.  Then 
the first person, or “sender,” is granted a certain amount of money and has to decide how much to   3
send to another person, located in another room.  The other person, the “recipient,” receives twice 
the amount sent, and has to decide how much to return to the sender.  Assuming that people’s 
payoffs are solely driven by monetary concerns, the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is 
straightforward: the sender will anticipate that the recipient will retain all the amount received, so 
the sender will refrain from sending even a penny.  Thus, any positive amount transferred by the 
sender is an indication of his or her degree of trust on the recipient, i.e., the subjective probability 
that the latter will return part of the amount sent.  
It is reasonable to suppose that this experimental approach to measuring trust is more 
precise than questionnaires, which lack a concrete exchange setting and monetary incentives to 
provide accurate responses.  Thus, we can validate the WVS/GSS trust measure by examining its 
correlation with the behavior of subjects in the lab.  Following this idea, we replicated the 
Glaeser et al. experiment using Brazilian subjects, namely students from the University of São 
Paulo.  We obtained the exact protocols from the authors and tried to match their experiment as 
close as possible.  Our study, however, provides two distinct contributions.  First, we run the 
same experiment in a country that has exhibited the lowest level of trust according to WVS data 
(Figure 1). This allows for an experimental cross-country examination, comparing our results 
with data from the WVS and the Glaeser et al. experiment, henceforth called the “Harvard” 
study.   Second, differently from the Harvard study, we run the “trust game” within two 
conditions.  In the Harvard study, subjects knew or, at least, could see with whom they were 
interacting.  In our study, we also examine interactions where individuals do not see their 
partners—which was the approach originally used by Berg et al. (1995).  Presumably, this should 
reduce error in the validation of WVS/GSS measure because it avoid signals (verbal or physical) 
that individuals receive when they see each other prior to their interaction. 
<Figure 1 around here> 
  Despite these differences, and the fact that Brazilian subjects report lower levels of trust 
according to the WVS/GSS scale, our experimental results are strikingly similar to the Harvard 
study.  We find that the amount that senders transfer to recipients is not statistically correlated   4
with the degree of trust they express in the WVS/GSS scale as well as other alternative scales 
intended to measure trust.  Thus, we confirm that attitudinal measures of trust are poor indicators 
of the actual trusting behavior of subjects.  Surprisingly, this result holds even in the treatment 
where senders and recipients do not know each other.  Still in line with the results of the Harvard 
Study, we find that responses to the WVS/GSS scale are statistically correlated with the amount 
that recipients return to senders.  Thus, attitudinal measures of trust may indicate trustworthiness, 
instead of trusting behavior.  However, the WVS/GSS measure contributes to only 9% of the 
variability of the amount of money that recipients return to senders.  Overall, the pattern of 
results in our experiment is not significantly different from the Harvard study, thus suggesting 
that WVS/GSS indicators may be, to a large extent, measuring something other than trust or 
trustworthiness.    
  This paper proceeds as follows.  We begin by describing the experiments used to gather 
behavioral measures of trust.  We then proceed by analyzing our data and performing cross-




  Our subjects were students from the University of São Paulo recruited through e-mail 
messages and class announcements.  Most students were economics or business majors, though 
we tried to avoid advanced students with training in game theory.
1  In our research—henceforth 
called the “USP” (University of São Paulo) study—152 students agreed to participate, but only 
138 participated in the actual experiments.  By comparison, 258 students agreed to participate in 
the Harvard study, although only 189 yielded experimental data.   
When subjects signed up for the experiment, they were handed a questionnaire including 
demographic, social, and academic questions, besides several trust-related items.  This 
                                                 
1 Knowing equilibrium concepts can bias the results towards the less cooperative outcome where no amount will be 
transferred from senders to recipients (Frank, Gilovich and Regan, 1993).    5
questionnaire, as well as all the other experimental materials, are translations into Portuguese 
(jointly performed by the authors) of the materials used in the Harvard study.  To facilitate 
comparison, the translation of the WVS/GSS trust variable was taken from the survey used by the 
research organization in Brazil who has collected data for the World Values Survey.  Table 1 
includes a description of the key trust-related attitudinal variables used in our analyses.  The 
experiment was conducted one week after the sign up phase (around May-June of 2003).    
<Table 1 around here> 
The Trust Game 
  In the “trust game”,
2 a person (sender) is given a certain amount of money, which can be 
totally or partially transferred to another person (recipient), located in a different room.  In the 
Harvard study, senders received US$ 15.  Given the extreme volatility of the Brazilian currency 
(real, R$) by the time of our experiment, it was difficult to define an exchange rate, adjusted for 
purchasing power, that would enable cross-country comparison of results (e.g. Roth, Prasnikar, 
Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir, 1991).  We decided to choose an exchange rate of 2 because it 
roughly guaranteed that the amount of money received by senders could buy similar goods 
valued by students.  Thus, US$ 15 and R$ 30 could equally buy one music CD in the USA and 
Brazil respectively by the time each experiment was carried out.   
  Figure 2 depicts the trust game in extensive form.
3  The sender is given R$ 30 and 
chooses to send to the recipient an amount x ∈ [0, $30].  The amount sent x is doubled; thus, the 
recipient gets 2x, and chooses an amount y ∈ [0, 2x] to return to the sender.  The sender’s and 
recipient’s monetary payoffs are, therefore, $30 – x + y and 2x – y respectively.  Supposing that it 
is common knowledge that subjects’ payoffs are driven only by monetary considerations, the 
subgame perfect equilibrium of this game is simple.  Since the recipient’s payoff is 
monotonically decreasing with y (the amount that is returned to the sender), the recipient will 
choose y = 0.  Anticipating this, the sender will choose x = 0 as well.  Therefore, any amount x > 
                                                 
2 As in the Harvard study, the trust game is referred to as “the transfer game” in the instructions for participants. 
3 Although monetary values are discrete, we represent choices in Figure 2 as continuous for simplicity.   6
0 that the sender decides to transfer to the recipient is a (behavioral) measure of the sender’s trust, 
and any amount y > 0 that the recipient decides to return to the sender is a measure of the 
recipient’s trustworthiness. 
  Following the Harvard study, we implement a “blind” procedure where experimenters are 
not allowed to know the decisions of subjects.  Namely, in each step of the game subjects write 
their decisions on a record sheet, placing it in an envelope with an anonymous code that they had 
previously chosen.  Experimenters do not know the mapping of codes onto subjects’ actual 
names.  However, the Harvard study was conducted in such a way that senders knew the identity 
of recipients and vice-versa—a condition we refer to as single-blind, because only experimenters 
were unaware of the identity of participants.  Before playing the trust game, Harvard subjects 
who were paired with one another had an opportunity to interact face-to-face.  Namely, they were 
handed a “social connection” questionnaire asking, among other things, the number of personal 
acquaintances they had in common.  Then subjects were separated into two different rooms: one 
with subjects playing the role of senders, and the other with subjects playing the role of 
recipients. 
  We randomly assigned half the subjects to these exact experimental conditions, and half 
the subjects to another condition involving a double-blind procedure, which was originally 
adopted by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).  The double-blind procedure guarantees that 
experimenters and participants do not know the actual identity of each other.  Thus, subjects were 
randomly assigned to the role of sender or recipient as they arrived for the experiment and were 
sent to separate rooms, without ever seeing their partners.
4  In our view, this procedure is more 
appropriate to validate attitudinal, questionnaire-based measures of trust using behavioral data.  
This is because, upon seeing each other, individuals receive signals that likely influence their 
subsequent decisions in the experiment.  For instance, senders may judge recipients’ 
                                                 
4 In the Berg-Dickhaut-McCabe experiment, any amount transferred from senders to recipients was tripled rather 
than doubled.  Glaeser et al. (2000) justify their choice of doubling the money as a way to compensate for subjects’ 
higher incentives to cooperate given that they knew each other.  However, this reduces the propensity of senders to 
transfer money because they will not have much to gain from it.  Although we would have preferred to triple the 
amount sent, we chose to double the amount to carry out direct comparisons to the Harvard study.   7
trustworthiness based on “cheap talk” or physical characteristics (Frank, 1988) in a way that is 
not controlled by the experimental procedure.  Also, subjects may make use of informal 
retaliation strategies that are unobserved by the experiments: for instance, recipients may be more 
reluctant to defect if they perceive that senders will apply personal sanctions after the experiment 
is concluded.  As a consequence, senders that declare themselves as trusting in the WVS/GSS 
scale may behave differently after interacting face-to-face with recipients.   Our study, which 
encompasses both single-blind and double-blind conditions, potentially controls for this effect. 
  Another feature of the Harvard study, which is also present in our study, is that half the 
recipients were given an opportunity to send a promise to the sender, as follows.  Prior to the 
decisions in the trust game, randomly chosen recipients received a sheet where they could choose 
between two options: (a) making a promise to repay the sender at least as much as what the 
sender transferred, or (b) making no promise.  Recipients were told that the promise was non-
biding, and that no other additional message would be allowed.  Then senders proceeded with 
their decisions. 
Envelope Drop 
  After the end of the trust game, subjects had the option to volunteer for an additional 
experiment, the “envelop drop.”  Subjects had to answer individually a series of questions asking 
whether they would an envelope with their address and containing R$ 20, which should be 
dropped by experimenters in a public place within certain pre-specified conditions, or a lower 
amount of money for sure, in cash.   
Subjects filled out 15 tables with 9 lines each.  Lines varied the amount of money for sure 
that subjects could possibly receive (from R$ 2 to R$ 18).  Presumably, subjects with a lower 
degree of trust (in the experimenters, in the pedestrians who might make an effort to return the 
envelope, and in the mail service) should choose lower levels of money for sure instead of the R$ 
20 envelope.  Thus, the lowest amount of money that subjects agree to trade for the envelope 
drop, referred to as their reservation value, is an additional indication of their level of trust.  
Tables, in turn, varied drop conditions: location where the envelope will be dropped, period (day   8
or night), whether the envelope will be sealed and stamped, etc.  We tried to match the locations 
chosen in the Harvard study as close as possible, according to their key characteristics.
5  As in the 
Harvard study, we averaged subjects’ reservation values across the 15 tables.   
  To create incentives for truthful responses, for each individual we randomly drew a 
number from 1 to 9 and another number from 1 to 15, corresponding to a particular line and table 
of the questionnaire respectively.  Depending on the student’s choice in that table and line, we 
ended up either dropping the envelope a couple of weeks later (according to the conditions 
specified in the table) or providing the student with the corresponding cash.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Overview 
Table 2 provides a summary of comparative results including both our study and the 
experiment at Harvard.  Only 21,7% of the Brazilian students affirm to trust other people, which 
is significantly lower (p < 0.01) than the level reported in the Harvard experiment (42,6%).  This 
difference is consistent with the results from the WVS applied to a larger sample of individuals 
from both countries (Figure 1), though our Brazilian students apparently show a higher level of 
self-reported trust than the larger Brazilian sample used in the WVS. 
<Table 2 around here> 
Perhaps not surprising, the amount sent by students in the USP study is significantly 
higher (p < 0.01) in the single-blind treatment ($25.71 on average), where subjects knew their 
partners, than in the double-blind procedure where no such information was available ($16.88 on 
average).  (We report throughout our results in Brazilian currency, doubling the dollar values 
from the Harvard study, according to our chosen exchange rate.)  Through face-to-face 
interactions, senders can apparently get signals that might increase their trust in particular “types” 
                                                 
5 For instance, a possible location for the envelope drop in the Harvard study was Harvard Square, which is a central 
place at Harvard University with an intense traffic of people.  At the University of São Paulo, a similarly central 
location with heavy traffic is the place where banks and ATM machines are clustered.     9
of recipients, or implicitly make use of informal enforcement mechanisms (e.g., some personal 
retaliation against a recipient who defected, when they meet again after the experiment).  Results 
presented in the table also indicates that the single- and double-blind treatments do not 
significantly differ in terms of the trust-related variables WVS/GSS and MRV, thus suggesting 
that possible differences in observed behavior across these treatments are not merely a result of 
differences in subjects’ intrinsic propensity to trust.  Also, the amount returned by recipients is 
significantly lower in the double-blind treatment (p < 0.01), thus suggesting that some recipients 
in the single-blind condition may refrain from acting opportunistically fearing that senders will 
apply some form of personal retaliation when they meet again after the experiment ends. 
Since the Harvard study was carried out in a single-blind fashion, it is more appropriate to 
compare their results with our results from the single-blind treatment.  Although Brazilian 
subjects significantly self-report lower levels of trust than students from Harvard, the average 
amount sent is roughly 80% of the amount initially received by the participants, which is not 
significantly different from the amount sent by participants in the Harvard study.  Likewise, the 
percentage of participants who sent the maximum amount allowed by the game at the initial 
decision node ($30) is about the same for the two distinct experiments (71% for the Harvard 
study and 77% for our study).  The average amount returned by Brazilian students in the single-
blond condition ($25.83) is also very close to the amount returned by Harvard subjects ($24.60).  
Thus, we do not have evidence that the Harvard and USP students who participated in the 
experiments differ in terms of their behavioral propensity to trust or be trustworthy, although they 
do differ in their attitudinal responses to the WVS/GSS scale.    
Determinants of the Amount Sent 
We next consider the effect of alternative measures of trust on the amount sent (Table 3). 
All regressions include several controls, some of which were also used in the Harvard study: the 
day when the experiment was conducted (a dummy variable coded 1 if the experiment was 
conducted in the second day, since sessions were conducted on two different days); the type of 
treatment (single-blind or double-blind); the gender composition of the pair (a dummy variable   10
coded 1 if partners are of the same sex); an indicator for cases where senders made a promise to 
recipients when they were allowed to do so; an indicator for cases where senders were not 
allowed to make any promise; and several demographic indicators such as gender (dummy coded 
1 if subject is male), race (dummy coded 1 if subject is white), academic status (dummy coded 1 
if student is a freshman), and an indicator for whether the student is only child or not. 
<Table 3 around here> 
OLS regressions with the squared value of the amount sent (relative to the initial amount 
received) as a dependent variable
6 reveal that the day of the experiment, the type of treatment 
(single-blind) and the freshman indicator are the only significant coefficients. When senders 
know recipients, they send a higher amount of money than in the double-blind treatment (p < 
0.05). Subjects who participated in the second day of the experiment were also, for some reason, 
more trusting (p < 0.05, except model (1) where p < 0.10).
7  The freshman indicator shows that 
subjects who just enrolled the university send lower amounts to recipients (p < 0.05), possibly 
suggesting that students increase their degree of trust as they evolve in their academic program.  
Other demographic variables, however, are insignificant, except the dummy variable Man in 
model (4), which is marginally significant (p < 0.10).  Also, recipients’ promise does not 
significantly affect senders’ propensity to trust.  Although this is apparently inconsistent with 
previous experimental results showing that non-binding promises matter (e.g. Malhotra and 
Murninghan, 2002), it is not so surprising in our context because recipients’ promise was not 
enforced in any way.   
All the trust measures used in the regressions (described in Table 1) are insignificant, 
including the GSS/WVS measure.  This result is aligned with the finding in the Harvard study 
that attitudinal measures of trust poorly predict the actual amount sent by subjects (a behavioral 
measure of trust) in experimental conditions.  Furthermore, the insignificance of all measures of 
                                                 
6 This transformation was employed to reduce heteroscedasticity.  
7 This is not due to the experimental treatments.  In each experimental day, we had both single-blind and double-
blind sessions.   11
trust does not change across treatments (single-blind or double-blind).  This rejects our conjecture 
that the lack of significant correlation between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust in the 
Harvard of study might be due to the fact that the experiment was not double-blind, which could 
make subjects either act upon signals they would receive after meeting their partners in person, or 
make use of informal retaliation strategies that are unobserved to the experimenter.  Apparently, 
attitudinal measures of trust poorly predict behavior in the experiment even in the case where 
subjects do not see each other prior to their interaction. 
However, the mean reservation value (MRV) expressed by senders in the subsequent 
envelope drop experiment is significantly related to their amount sent (p < 0.01), and this effect 
is significantly reduced in the single-blind condition (p < 0.05), where subjects could interact 
face-to-face.  This may explain why Glaeser et al. did not find any significant effect of MRV on 
the amount sent, since their experiment was solely single-blind.  Since the envelope drop 
experiment essentially involves a condition where individuals do not know with whom they are 
interacting (i.e., the person who might return the envelope), its results should be compared to the 
results of trust game experiments where individuals do not meet face-to-face. 
Determinants of the Amount Returned    
Our next set of results explores the behavior of recipients, employing the ratio of the 
amount returned to the amount sent as a dependent variable (Table 4).  As we discussed before, 
we expect that recipients who are known by senders should increase their amount returned 
fearing that the latter will employ personal sanctions when they meet again after the experiment 
is concluded.  Although simple mean comparisons show significant differences across treatments 
(Table 2), regressions in Table 4 provide no firm evidence that the ratio is significantly higher 
when subjects know each other: the variable Single-blind is only significant (p < 0.05) in model 
specification (3), being marginally significant (p < 0.10) in model (1).  Apparently, face-to-face 
interaction increases trust but has a weaker effect on trustworthy behavior after we control for 
some personal characteristics of recipients.  
<Table 4 around here>   12
Results from Table 4 also show that recipients who promise to return at least as much as 
what their partners send significantly return more money (p < 0.05).  Notice, however, that the 
variable coding recipients who could not make any promise is significant as well (p < 0.05), and 
with a coefficient of similar magnitude.  This is because the reference group in this case is the set 
of recipients that had an opportunity to make a promise and chose not to do so; those individuals 
significantly return less money.  Thus, only individuals who refuse to make any promise in fact 
“stick to their word.”  Promises are apparently interpreted by recipients as strictly non-binding 
and hence have no relationship with their subsequent behavior.  Demographic variables, as well 
as the dummy variable coding the day when the session was conducted, do not significantly 
explain recipients’ choices.   
The amount sent by the player “sender” is significantly positive (p < 0.05) in all cases 
except in the regression specification (3), where it is marginally significant (p < 0.10). This result 
indicates that the higher the amount of money sent, the higher the amount returned, thus 
suggesting that subjects are driven by reciprocity concerns: a recipient who is granted trust is 
inclined to honor the sender’s trust (Berg et al., 1995). 
Concerning our measures of trust, we find that the GSS/WVS Trust and the Trust Index 
significantly affect the amount returned by recipients (p < 0.05).  Again, this is aligned with the 
results of Harvard study: attitudinal measures of trust appear to predict trustworthiness, instead of 
trust.  Namely, subjects who declare to be more trusting are actually more trustworthy, that is, 
they return a higher portion of the money they receive from senders.  However, those variables 
explain a very modest portion of the total variability of the dependent variable:  9% for the 
WVS/GSS scale and 13% for the Trust Index.  Interestingly, the attitudinal measures of 
trustworthiness—Self-reported Trustworthiness and Honesty Index (see Table 1)—are 
insignificant, thus confirming again the poor ability of attitudinal measures to predict behavior in 
controlled experiments.   13
Figures 3 and 4 summarize these results. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the 
average amount sent by participants who declare to be non-trusting and the participants who 
declare the opposite. The difference between the average amount sent by subject within each 
group is insignificant. However, when observing the ratio of amount returned to the amount sent 
(Figure 4), we see that a person who does not trust others returns a lower amount of money than a 
person who declares to trust other people. This reinforces the result (also found in the Harvard 
study) that that a person who affirms to trust others tends to be more trustworthy.  
Envelope Drop Results 
Regressions in Table 5 examine the effect of subjects’ personal characteristics on their 
mean reservation value (MRV) in the envelope drop experiment.  Although most variables are 
insignificant across alternative model specifications, the indicator variable for white subjects 
shows a negative and significant impact on the mean reservation in some regressions (p < 0.05).  
Thus, white subjects appear to be less trusting: they are willing to trade the $20 envelope for 
lower amounts of money for sure than other subjects. 
<Table 5 around here> 
  Some attitudinal scales have some role in predicting subjects’ MRV in the envelope drop 
experiment.  Thus, the WVS/GSS trust measure is positively associated with MRV, as well as a 
variable called Pro-transfer (also used in the Harvard study), which measures subjects’ propensity 
to favor redistribution to the poor.
8  A possible explanation for the role of this variable in 
explaining subjects’ MRV is that “dropping the envelope itself is seen as an act of charity” 
(Glaeser et al., 2000, p. 829), thus increasing the willingness of individuals with redistribution 
concerns to accept the envelope.  However, the significance of those variables is marginal (p < 
0.10): we have poor evidence that attitudinal measures explain choices in the envelope drop 
experiment.  
 
                                                 
8 Measured according to the following agreement scale: “Personal income shouldn’t be determined by work”.   14
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Attitudinal measures of trust, such as the WVS/GSS scale, have been shown to be 
correlated with important country-level variables reflecting economic and institutional 
development (e.g. Knack and Kiefer, 1997; La Porta et al., 1997; Zak and Knack, 2001).  An 
important research agenda, in this sense, is to assess what exactly those scales measure.   
Following the idea advanced by Glaeser et al. (2000), we provide in this study a validation of 
attitudinal measures of trust based on behavior measures of trust obtained from experimental 
sessions involving monetary transfers in the context of a “trust game” (Berg et al., 1995).   
Echoing Glaeser’s et al. results, we find that attitudinal measures of trust (such as the WVS/GSS 
scale) do not significantly explain trusting behavior in experimental transactions.  However, 
attitudinal measures of trust do explain trustworthy behavior: individuals who affirm to be more 
trusting are actually less inclined to act opportunistically.     
Although the overall thrust of our study is not strictly new, our test differs from Glaeser’s 
et al. in two important ways.  First, we examine whether attitudinal measures of trust explain 
trusting behavior not only when interacting individuals can see each other (the design employed 
by Glaeser et al.), but also when then cannot see each other.  In the first case, responses may be 
affected by signals and social interactions (unobserved to the experimenters) that may attenuate 
the correlation between attitudinal and behavior measures of trust.  As it turns out, we find 
absence of significant correlation even when individuals cannot see each other prior to their 
interaction.  In an independent study, Bellemare and Kröger (2003) also evaluate the relationship 
between attitudinal and behavioral measures of trust and, differently from our results, find a 
significant and positive correlation.  This discrepancy in results invites further tests with distinct 
design conditions. 
Second, we run experiments in a country that has systematically exhibited the lowest level 
of trust according to the WVS measure: Brazil (see Table 1).  This allows for a cross-country 
comparison of results between Brazil (our study) and the United States, since we tried to replicate 
Glaeser’s et al protocols as close as possible.  Although Brazilian subjects report significantly   15
lower levels of trust than American subjects according to the WVS scale, their experimental 
responses do not significantly differ in terms of both the amount sent and the amount returned by 
recipients.  This reinforces the idea that attitudinal responses are poorly related to behavior in 
controlled experiments. 
Given these results, how can we explain the sharp differences in self-reported trust 
between Brazilian and US subjects according to WVS indicators?  Since attitudinal measures 
appear to explain trustworthiness instead of trust, one might be tempted to conclude that 
Brazilians are less trustworthy instead of less trusting.  However, those attitudinal measures 
explain only a small fraction of the variability of the amount returned by recipients in our 
experiment (around 9% in the case of the WVS/GSS scale).  This might explain why direct 
comparisons between the results from the Harvard and USP experiments do not show significant 
differences in observed behavior, despite the fact that Brazilian students report lower levels of 
trust according to the WVS/GSS scale compared to their American counterparts who participated 
in the Harvard experiment.    
Certainly, there are other factors driving the marked heterogeneity in attitudinal trust 
according to the WVS.  A possible explanation is that the WVS scale may be also measuring 
something other than trust or trustworthiness. For instance, it may simply be capturing the 
effectiveness of legal enforcement across countries.  When answering whether they “trust” or not 
people in general, respondents may simply be expressing their perception of the institutional 
environment of the country leading to more or less cooperation.  In fact, the inefficiency of the 
Brazilian law system is well documented (e.g. Stone, Levy and Paredes, 1996).  This explanation 
is consistent with Zak and Knack’s (2001) finding that the WVS trust measure is positively 
correlated with several measures of the strength of formal enforcement institutions.   
This goes back to Williamson’s (1993) criticism of the literature on trust.  If trust is 
simply the expectation that a transacting party will not behave opportunistically (e.g. Gambetta, 
1988), then it may well be affected by the existence of legal penalties or other mechanisms of 
formal enforcement.  WVS-like scales do not take this nuance into account, and hence may be   16
poor indicators of actual trusting behavior in the absence of formal enforcement—which, indeed, 
is the setting of experimental sessions used to validate those scales.  Trust should properly be 
defined as the expectation that another person will not act opportunistically even in the absence of 
formal enforcement (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994).  This suggests a possible way in which 
WVS-like scales could be refined in the future. 
Another possible explanation of why Brazil exhibits a level of trust (measured by the 
WVS scale) that is much lower than in other countries is that respondents may be influenced by 
stereotypes of the Brazilian culture.  Thus, when answering whether they trust “people in 
general,” Brazilians may provide a biased assessment based on popular types such as the 
“malandro”: a person who is supposed to achieve social status solely by acting in his or her self-
interest (DaMatta, 1991).  When faced with a concrete setting (experimental transactions), 
subjects may be forced to provide more accurate assessments of the probability a particular 
person will act opportunistically.   
Thus, our results confirm that analyses based on attitudinal measures of trust should be 
carried out with caution.  We stress, however, that our study has important limitations.  First, as is 
customary in controlled experiments, the sample size is small and not representative of the 
populations under consideration.  Second, although we tried to replicate the experiment of 
Glaeser et al. as close as possible, we have not controlled for “experimenter effects,” as cross-
country differences may be due, in part, to different operational procedures and personal 
characteristics of researchers who implemented the experiment in each country.  A possible way 
to deal with this problem in future studies is to assign the same experimenter to different 
locations (e.g. Roth et al., 1991), which nonetheless has the downside of increasing costs.  More 
studies along the lines of validating attitudinal measures of trust and other social variables of 
economic interest, using larger samples and refining the methods to promote cross-county 
comparisons, are certainly needed. 
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Table 1: Attitudinal measures of trust and trustworthiness 
 
Item(s)  Variable 
English (Harvard study)  Portuguese (USP study) 
WVS/GSS Trust  “Generally speaking, would you say (a) 
that most people can be trusted or (b) 
that you can’t be too careful in dealing 
with people?” 
“De um modo geral, você diria (a) que se 
pode confiar nas pessoas em geral ou (b) 
que precisamos ter bastante cuidado 




- “Would you say that most of the time 
people (a) try to be helpful, or (b) that 
they are mostly just looking out for 
themselves?” 
- “Do you think most people would try 
(a) to take advantage of you if they got a 
chance, or would they try (b) to be fair?”
- WVS/GSS 
- “Você diria que a maioria das pessoas 
(a) tentam ser úteis ou (b) estão na 
maioria das vezes apenas olhando para si 
mesmas?” 
- “Você acha que a maioria das pessoas 
tentariam (a) tirar vantagens de você se 
elas tivessem chance ou (b) ser justas?” 
Trust Behavior Index 
(frequency scale) 
 
- “How often do you lend money to your 
friends?” 
- “How often do you lend personal 
possessions to your friends (e.g., CD’s, 
clothes, bicycle, etc....)?” 
- “How often do you intentionally leave 
your rooming group’s hallway door 
unlocked (when nobody is home)?” 
- “Com que freqüência você empresta 
dinheiro a seus amigos?” 
- “Com que freqüência você empresta 
artigos pessoais a seus amigos (ex.., 
CD’s, roupas, bicicleta, etc....)?” 
- “Com que freqüência você 
intencionalmente deixa a porta do 
corredor do seu quarto ou apartamento 
destrancada (quando ninguém está em 
casa)?” 
Trust in Strangers 
(agreement scale)  
- “These days you can't count on 
strangers.” 
- “In dealing with strangers one is better 
off to be cautious until they have 
provided evidence that they are 
trustworthy.” 
- “Nesses dias, não se pode confiar em 
estranhos.” 
- “Ao lidar com estranhos é melhor ser 
cuidadoso até que eles forneçam 








- “How often do you lie to your 
parents?” 
- “How often do you lie to your 
roommates?” 
- “How often do you lie to casual 
acquaintances?” 
- “How often do you lie to close 
friends?” 
- “If you have a girlfriend/boyfriend, 
how often do you lie to her/him?” 
- “Com que freqüência você mente para 
seus pais?” 
- “Com que freqüência você mente para 
os seus companheiros de quarto?” 
- “Com que freqüência você mente para 
pessoas que você encontra casualmente?”
- “Com que freqüência você mente para 
amigos íntimos?” 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 











WVS/GSS (% who affirm 

















% who sent the maximum 
value possible ($30) 
0.71 0.55 0.32 0.77 








Ratio of the amount 







Average of Mean 







  Note: Standard deviations are in parenthesis.  Monetary values of the Harvard study were doubled to 
  allow for comparisons to the results of the USP study.    21
 
Table 3: Determinants of the Amount Sent (Squared Root) 
 





































































































WVS/GSS Trust  0,407 
(0,633) 
    
WVS/GSS Trust×Single-blind  -1,358 
(0,885) 
    
Trust Index    0,061 
(0,112) 
   
Trust Index×Single-blind    -0,227 
(0,163) 
   
Trust in Strangers     0,805 
(0,557) 
  
Trust in Strangers×Single-blind     -0,832 
(0,923) 
  
Trust Behavior Index      -0,143 
(0,147) 
 
Trust Behavior Index×Single-blind      0,333 
(0,205) 
 
Mean Reservation Value (MRV)       0,124 
(0,043) 
MRV×Single-blind       -0,154 
(0,068) 
Adjusted R
2   0.249  0.254  0.209  0.247  0.326 
N  61  61  61  61  61 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  OLS estimates. 
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Table 4: Determinants of the Ratio of the Amount Returned to the Amount Sent 
 

























































































WVS/GSS Trust  0.224 
(0.087) 
   
Trust Index    0.047 
(0.016) 
  
Self-reported Trustworthiness     -0.041 
(0.046) 
 
Honesty Index      0.026 
(0.037) 
Adjusted R
2   0.245  0.269  0.143  0.250 
N  55  53  55  48 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  OLS estimates.   23
Table 5: Dependent Variable: Mean Reservation Value (MRV) 
 























































Trust Index    0.275 
(0.197)    
 
Trust in Strangers     0.069 
(0.930) 
  




Pro-transfer       0.891 
(0.482) 
Adjusted R
2   0.037  0.021  0.006  0.006  0.026 
N  121  117  121  121  120 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  OLS estimates.   24



























































































































































































































































































































Is given $30; 
Sends  x ∈ 
[0,$30] 
Receives 2x; 
Returns         
y ∈ [0, 2x] 
Payoffs: 
($30 – x + y, 
2x – y) 
Sender  Reci-
pient   26
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Figure 3:  Ratio of the Amount Returned to the Amount Sent, According to Recipients’ Attitudinal Level of Trust (95% 
Confidence Interval) 
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